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THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: A RESPONSE
GANESH SITARAMAN

I am very grateful to the Boston University Law Review for bringing together
such a terrific group of scholars to engage with my book, The Crisis of the
Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic.
It is a testament to the work and excellence of the Boston University Law Review
that they pulled together such an intellectually engaging group of commentators.
My deepest thanks also to Professors Markovits, Rahman, Lyons, Epstein, and
Somin for taking the time to read the book and comment on it.
Professor Daniel Markovits, with characteristic insight, observes that my
argument is distinct from both the unconventional view that money is power and
the conventional view that money buys power. Rather, I recognize the truth in
both and argue that the “economic perversions” of American democracy today
are “distinctive and contingent.” He also astutely observes that middle-class
constitutions are fundamentally liberal, in their “insistence on formal equality of
political participation,” among other things, and that class warfare constitutions
are fundamental illiberal because they “violat[e] formal political equality” in
acknowledging and accounting for the differential power of economic classes.
These few observations capture much of the spirit and thrust of the book.
Without understanding the relationship between money and power (and going
beyond the narrow view that money corrupts only through campaign channels),
we cannot actually grapple seriously with the problem. Once we understand the
scope of the problem, it also illuminates constitutional design choices that have
long been ignored—namely, the divide between class warfare and middle-class
constitutions.
At the same time, however, Professor Markovits points out that my “cure
mistakes the depth of [my] own diagnosis” because the constitutional structure
itself is distorted by the problems of inequality. In other words, if the system is
so rigged by the power of money (in both forms) and if it is based on a middle
class constitutional choice that is premised on formal equality, then how could
it ever be possible to reform the system? This is a good question. In the book, I
tried to anticipate and respond to this challenge, though perhaps unpersuasively.
First, throughout history there have been moments when reform was possible,
even in the midst of a relatively captured government. Acute crises, for example,
frequently lead to major changes—the Great Depression and reforms of the New
Deal are perhaps the paradigmatic example. Second, popular mobilization
coupled with reform-minded leaders has also led to change. The reforms of the
Progressive Era fit this pattern. So despite the seriousness of our problems, I
remain optimistic that reform is still possible.
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Professor Sabeel Rahman also offers much that I agree with. He notes that the
Progressive Era search for solutions to the problems of the Gilded Age were
about domination broadly construed, not economic inequality narrowly
understood. I completely agree. Because Progressives recognized that
domination came from the exercise of economic power, not just from money
buying power, for example, they invented antitrust laws to break up
concentrations of power. Rahman also argues that we should care about
economic equality not only to preserve democratic institutions (the core of my
argument) but also because democracy allows us to “contest those very
background structures of economic inequality and domination.” I agree with this
too. Democracy is radical because it gives we the people the freedom to organize
ourselves. This is a core insight of American political and legal thought, but one
that is too often forgotten today. We decide the rules of the system—and we do
it through democracy.
Professor Rahman suggests that I think we can make economic reforms after
efforts at racial and gender inclusion succeed, and he disagrees. He argues that
reforms need to happen and are happening today in an integrated fashion. I think
Rahman misreads my argument here, because I largely agree with Rahman on
this count as well. In the book, I argued that efforts at economic reform often
came after efforts at inclusion and that the former failed. Reconstruction, for
example, brought (formal) political and civil rights, but not economic justice.
My point was not prescriptive, that attempting to bifurcate these goals and
sequence them is the right path forward. Rather, it was descriptive, that people
throughout our history recognized that economic equality and inclusion were
connected, fought to achieve both aims, and often failed when it came to their
economic agenda. Rahman’s position is to try to make integrated change—to
build alliances across race and gender in order to achieve political and economic
reform together. Of course, throughout history many efforts along these lines
often failed as well (the Populists in the 1890s are an example), but like Rahman,
I also think this seems like the more promising path forward today.
Professor David Lyons had similar concerns. He notes that I recognize a
variety of qualifications to the middle-class tradition in American republican
thought, and he presents them starkly and systematically: the problems of
inclusion, the inefficacy of the safety valve of western lands, the ideology of
white supremacy, the reality of class conflict, and the wealthy being divided
between North and South for much of history.
I agree that these are important qualifications, and at various points in the
book, as Lyons recognizes, I mention them (though I did not comment explicitly
on the fact that the wealthy were divided between the North and South, which is
an important point). The implicit critique embedded in Lyons’s response is that
the collection of these qualifications undermines the thrust of the book’s
argument. But I don’t think it does for three reasons. First, my task in the book
was to describe what the people themselves thought their project was, what they
were doing, and what their ideology was. This is a far cry from evaluating them
with hindsight or moral principles in mind. For example, they might have
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thought Western lands were a safety value for inequality and relied on that fact
in policymaking, even if the expansion West wasn’t effective at serving the
safety valve function. Second, understanding the middle-class tradition is
important today, even with its qualifications and limitations, because it
establishes a set of aspirations and traditions that can both inspire action and
provide foundation and guidance for action. Third, as in my response to
Professor Rahman, these limitations and qualifications can also suggest
alternative paths forward for reform.
From the other side of the political spectrum, Professor Richard Epstein
argues that I overstate the importance of economic inequality, ignore the decline
in economic growth, and downplay polarization. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I
disagree. Some of his arguments rely on anecdote rather than evidence, as when
he cites the presence of rich people on the right (Koch brothers) and left (Soros),
rather than the extensive political science research that shows that wealthy
people and corporate interests not only have different views from everyone else
but also that public policy is far more responsive to them than to ordinary
people’s preferences. His oft-repeated arguments about how regulations are the
source of our economic problems are rhetorically common these days but I don’t
think they hold up very well. As one example, George Mason economist Alex
Tabarrok has recently published a paper showing that federal regulations are not
causing the decline in dynamism in our economy.1
More broadly, his view that government regulation is the problem when it
comes to economic growth and the distribution of wealth seems, to me, to be at
odds with both history and common sense. The dominant ideology of the last
forty years has been a neoliberal one focused on deregulation, privatization,
liberalization of trade, and fiscal austerity and tax cuts for the rich. The result of
these policies—pushed and celebrated by both Republican and Democratic
congresses and presidential administrations—has been increases in economic
inequality, the wreckage of the financial crash of 2008, the extraordinary
corporate consolidation in virtually every sector of the economy, the precipitous
decline in union membership and power, and the pervasive corruption and
capture of government. Absent regulation, individual freedom is increasingly at
risk from the private sector as well: Corporations include non-compete and nopoach clauses that prevent competition in labor markets, they prevent workers
from speaking freely on the internet, they require the use of private arbitration
rather than the judicial system, and they spend boatloads of money to rig
government policies and keep the unregulated game going. “The road to hell,”

1

Alex Tabarrok, Federal Regulation Is Not the Cause of Declining Dynamism, MARGINAL
REVOLUTION (Feb. 5, 2018, 7:23 AM), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/
2018/02/federal-regulation-not-cause-declining-dynamism.html [https://perma.cc/Q48C-4JL
P].
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Epstein says, “is often paved with good intentions.”2 Indeed. And in this case, it
seems that the road to serfdom was paved by The Road to Serfdom.3
Professor Epstein also disagrees with my arguments about the American
constitutional tradition. His comments suggest that he thinks that there is a
singular tradition of the “founding” and that the “founders” had a singular vision
of what they were trying to do. This isn’t the right way to think about the history
of this period (or any period). The founding generation were a diverse group of
thinkers and political actors, whose views were varied, who disagreed fiercely,
and who compromised frequently. This is precisely why I argue that the middleclass constitutional tradition is a tradition, rather than the only tradition and why
I acknowledge that there were other important intellectual traditions at work
during the Founding Era.
More specifically, Professor Epstein’s objection relies on one quotation from
James Madison’s Federalist 10, though I’m sure he could have cited other
evidence (see my point earlier about multiple traditions).4 But he does not
engage with the considerable amount of evidence I have assembled to show that
concerns about economic inequality were widespread during the Founding Era
in every region of the country, among people of different political valences, and
across time; with the broader argument that the relative economic equality of the
era was an assumption and precondition for our republican constitution; or with
my multi-page interpretation of James Madison’s views and of Federalist 10
specifically.5
The biggest problem, however, is that Professor Epstein doesn’t engage with
the argument that economic power is a threat to freedom—either that private
power threatens freedom directly or that it can capture government and rig the
system to serve its own ends. Throughout history, some of the greatest minds
and statesmen were deeply concerned with this problem. Epstein should be too.
Another of my critics, Professor Ilya Somin, offers a similar set of objections
from a somewhat similar perspective, but he grapples carefully with many of the
complexities of these issues and much of the empirical evidence. Professor
Somin argues first that the “growing size and complexity of government” is a
bigger threat to our political system than is economic inequality because it is
“increasingly difficult for ordinary people to exercise effective control over
government—or even to understand what it is doing.”6 Second, he argues that I
ignore the Founders’ concern for property rights and limiting government
power.
2

Richard Epstein, Sitaraman’s Mistaken Case for the Middle-Class Constitution, 98 B.U.
L. REV. ONLINE 15, 17 (2018).
3 See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: TEXT AND DOCUMENTS (Bruce
Caldwell ed., 2007).
4 Epstein, supra note 2, at 19.
5 GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 100-04 (2018).
6 Ilya Somin, Why Growing Government is a Greater Political Menace than Growing
Inequality, 98 B.U. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 21 (2018).
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To take the second point first, I agree with Professor Somin that an important
tradition in the Founding Era was concerned with property rights, individual
liberty, and limited government. This tradition is commonly thought of as
“Lockean,” and it is well understood. My hope in the book was to emphasize the
middle-class tradition in republicanism, to which I think insufficient attention is
paid. At the same time, I would caution Somin from taking the Lockean tradition
too far, both historically and normatively. Historically, the Lockean tradition
was only one of many that were alive and flourishing at the time of the Founding,
and the Republican tradition was arguably far stronger in the overall ethos of the
period. Normatively, while the Lockean tradition is extremely important and
contributes a great deal of moral and political value, it also underrates the threat
of having an ineffectual government. Indeed, one of the most important reasons
for writing a new Constitution in 1787 was that the Articles of Confederation
government was too weak and decentralized, and, as a result, ineffective.
Professor Somin’s point on ignorance of government and government
complexity is well-taken. While we might disagree on the relative importance
of that problem versus the problem of inequality, I agree with Somin that
complexity and ignorance can be problems. Civic republicans throughout
American history (including during the Founding Era) were very concerned
about the need for an active and engaged citizenry to sustain republican
government. I also agree with Somin that complexity is a serious problem. It is
a problem because, as Somin notes, it makes capture and corruption more likely.
This is true when it comes to regulation. But complexity is also a problem
because complicated government programs are harder for people to use and they
can be less effective. Complexity might even degrade trust in government and
lead to feelings that government itself is ineffective. My own view is that we
should try to make government programs and regulations clearer and simpler—
and that we should be willing to be honest about the inevitable trade-offs that
come with embracing that approach. Where I think Somin falls into a trap is in
framing the question of complexity as tied to the size of government.
Governments can grow in size without complexity being of the type that
undermines civic engagement. For example, government will need to get larger
in size when a new state enters the Union. But there are many benefits to having
50 states from sea to shining sea instead of just the original 13. At the same time,
we shouldn’t be overly rosy about small governments. They can be corrupt,
captured, and ineffective too. To my mind, the real question we should be asking
isn’t whether government is bigger or smaller in some material sense, it is
whether government actions are simple and clear, whether it is effective at what
it does, and whether it is public-spirited rather than captured.

